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Abstract Explaining cooperative tendencies through an evolutionary lens has been problematic 
for theorists. Traditional explanations derive from theories of reciprocity, biological markets, and 
more recently via partner choice and sexual selection. The sexual selection hypothesis has been 
tested within game-theoretic frameworks gaining empirical sup- port in explaining the evolution 
of altruism. Males have been found to be more altruistic towards attractive females. However, 
previous research has predominantly adopted a design where participants are not engaging with 
‘real people’. Instead, participants make decisions when viewing images or hypothetical 
scenarios without visual cues. The present study aimed to investigate the sexual selection 
hypothesis using a face-to-face game theoretic framework. One hundred and thirty-eight 
participants played a 2-round ultimatum game with chocolate coins as the monetary incentive. 
We find, that physical attractiveness had no influence on generosity and cooperation when 
participants play a face-to-face ultimatum game. Instead, proposers were fair when allocating 
stakes, offering an average of half the endowment to responders. This study refutes the link 
between the sexual selection hypothesis and generosity when playing economic games with real 
people. Fairness appeared to drive generosity and cooperation.  




1 refers to an act which is beneficial to the receiver, yet costly for the altruist (Trivers 
1971). Explaining the purpose of altruism has been a challenge within a variety of disciplines, 
                                                     
1 Consistent with Barclay (2013) we use the terms altruism and generosity interchangeably. Both altruism and generosity confer benefits to a 
receiver whilst being costly to the altruist. Fairness is defined as equal sharing between giver and receiver (Baumard et al. 2013; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999).  
 
particularly for evolutionary theorists. Where altruism towards kin is well-founded, altruism 
towards non-kin is an evolutionary puzzle (Hamilton 1963). Altruism has been explained by 
theories of reciprocity (Alexander 1987; Axelrod 1984), costly signaling (where altruism relays 
one’s genetic quality, see Zahavi and Zahavi 1997) biological markets, (altruism evolves due to 
competitive mating markets, see Noe and Hammerstein 1995) and more recently via partner 
choice (people choose the most altruistic partners available within a mating market, see Barclay 
2013) and sexual selection (altruism acts as a mating signal, see Farrelly et al. 2007; Phillips et 
al. 2008).  
Recent research has tested the sexual selection hypothesis in explaining altruism within game-
theoretic frameworks, typically via online simulations or using facial images. Although sexual 
selection has received empirical support in explaining the evolution of altruism, little research 
has investigated the sexual selection hypothesis when participants are engaging with real people, 
as opposed to facial images. This paper tests the sexual selection hypothesis, adopting a game-
theoretic framework in a well-known game within game theory known as the ultimatum game.  
Altruism as a Mating Signal  
Nettle (2009) states that sexual selection is natural selection on the ability to gain mates^ (p. 
137). Darwin (1871) used sexual selection theory in an attempt to explain physical and 
behavioural traits which placed an organism at a survival disadvantage, yet providing a 
reproductive advantage. Examples include altruism and cooperation, which are costly to an 
individual’s fitness. Darwin was well aware that some of these traits were more prevalent in one 
sex of a specie and not the other, used when attempting to attract the opposite sex.  
The purpose of sexual selection is to maximise the chances of reproducing successfully and 
creating offspring through intra and inter-sexual competition. Darwin defined secondary sexual 
characteristics as ‘the advantage which certain individuals have over other individuals of the 
same sex and species, in exclusive relation to reproduction’ (Darwin 1871, p. 256). If a trait 
increases one’s reproductive success, it is more prominent in the gene pool and more likely to be 
passed onto future generations (Nettle 2009). Workman and Reader (2014) eloquently refer to 
sexual selection as ‘the survival of the sexiest’ (p. 65).  
Inter-sexual selection,
2 often referred to as female-choice refers to traits which are not 
necessarily involved in survival per se, but they increase one’s chances of being chosen as a 
mate. Inter-sexual competition predicts that it is males who should display ornaments to impress 
females as females need to be courted in order to consent to sexual engagement because they are 
the choosier sex (Brennan 2010; Workman and Reader 2014). Intra and inter-sexual competition 
then leads to sexual dimorphism, physical and behavioural differences be- tween the sexes. 
Therefore, altruism may have evolved through inter-sexual competition, detrimental to one’s 
short term survival, but if overcome, beneficial to one’s long-term mating encounters.  
The sexual selection hypothesis suggests that the purpose of cooperation and altruism are to 
attract mates because they are sexually selectable traits (Miller 2000; Roberts 1998; Zahavi 
1995). This may be because altruism signals commitment to- wards a partner and raises one’s 
mate value in the mating market (Barclay 2010; Haselton and Buss 2000). Males typically use 
altruism as a courtship display to signal their quality as a partner (Tessman 1995). Because 
females place a greater importance on a male’s ability to be gain resources, and males  
                                                     
2 This paper concerns itself with inter-sexual competition, as opposed to intra-sexual competition. For further information on intra-sexual compe- 
tition, see Workman and Reader (2014).  
 
value a female’s physical attractiveness (Buss 1989), females should value altruistic and 
cooperative mates, more so than males (Barclay 2010). Females should value cooperative traits 
due to larger parental investment and increased likelihood that offspring will inherit cooperative 
tendencies (Anderson 1994). Parental investment theory suggests that human mate preferences 
have evolved due to differential investment each sex provides for offspring. Human females 
invest more than males into offspring, both biologically and through nurturing (Trivers 1972). 
However, males also offer a substantial level of parental investment in terms of resource 
acquisition and sharing (Kaplan and Hill 1985). Due to the value females place on cooperation 
and altruism in a mate, research has found that males exhibit altruistic and cooperative traits as 
courtship dis- plays, consistent with the sexual selection hypothesis (Barclay 2010; Farrelly et al. 
2007; Goldberg 1995; Iredale et al. 2008; Miller 2000; Oda et al. 2011; Van Vugt and Iredale 
2013). In support, traits which signal a male’s cooperative tendencies are highly sought by 
females (Buss 1989; Miller 2000).  
For females, choosing a cooperative mate increases the survival rate of future offspring (Spinath 
and O’Conner 2003; Kokko 1998). For a female, being choosy when selecting a mate is crucial 
as choosing a mate who does not possess cooperative tendencies increases the risk of abandon- 
ment and a lack of resources for future offspring. In order to test the sexual selection hypothesis 
in explaining altruism, it is important to investigate the factors which influence cooperation 
(Miller 2007).  
We have discussed sexual selection as an explanation for the evolution of altruism. However, 
theories of competitive altruism (Roberts 1998), strong altruism and biological market theory 
have also received empirical interest. Recent models explaining altruism have incorporated 
partner choice (See Barclay 2013). Partner choice models assist in explaining how we choose the 
best mates available from the mating market, and the strategies we use to form relationships 
(Barclay 2016). Research has predominantly found that altruists are preferred as mates compared 
to non-altruists (Barclay 2010; Farrelly 2013). Biological markets theory (Noe and Hammerstein 
1995) suggests that many traits and behaviours can be explained by market forces (Chiang 
2010). As a result, people compete with others on traits such as altruism with an aim to increase 
their market value (Barclay 2016). Biological markets theory argues that partner choice is 
influenced by the perceived benefits of the qualities avail- able in the market pool from which 
one can choose a partner (Barclay 2013). These fitness benefits can be applied to oneself or 
one’s offspring. According to biological markets, people should choose the most altruistic 
partners available in order to confer those benefits to oneself and future offspring. By choosing 
the best available, one has a selective advantage over others (see Barclay 2013 for a review).  
Physical Attractiveness, Game Theory and Altruism  
Behavioural game theory has been used extensively when investigating altruism and cooperation 
(see Camerer 2003; Fehr and Gachter 2002). Economic games enable us to test simple 
predictions and identify moderators of coopera- tive behaviour (Benenson et al. 2007; Cappelen 
et al. 2013). Game theoretic research has found that physical attractiveness may moderate how 
we distribute resources when playing economic games (Farrelly et al. 2007). Due to differences 
in parental investment, the sexes may differ in altruistic behaviour. For example, females tend to 
be more generous (Oswald et al. 2004) and kinder (Conway et al. 1996) than males (see Balliet 
et al. 2011 for a review).  
Attractive people are treated more favourably than unattractive people in a number of domains, 
commonly known as the attractiveness halo effect (see Bak 2010; Dion et al. 1972; Langlois et 
al. 2000; Lorenzo et al. 2010; Maner et al. 2003). Physical attractiveness influences mate 
acquisition and reproductive success (Jokela 2009). Males and females are more generous and 
cooperative towards physically attractive people when playing economic games (e.g. Andreoni 
& Petrie, 2008; Farrelly et al. 2007; Mulford et al. 1998; Solnick and Schweitzer 1999), in both 
developed and developing countries (McAndrew and Periloux 2012).  
Moreover, males have been found to behave more generously towards attractive females (Eagly 
and Crowley 1986; Goldberg 1995; Iredale et al. 2008; Miller 2000) displaying higher levels of 
competitive altruism than females (Raihani and Smith 2015). People are also more trusting 
towards attractive people when playing economic games (Wilson and Eckel 2006). Self-rated 
attractiveness was also measured in this pa- per. Self-rated attractiveness has been found to 
influence how participants engage with one another when playing an economic game (see Stirrat 
et al. 2011). Males and females have been found to be more selfish towards those who are more 
attractive than themselves. Furthermore, self-rated attractive- ness has been found to be a 
predictor of attitudes towards inequality with those who consider themselves highly attractive 
being more agreeable on social inequality (Belmi and Neale 2014), which is also found in game-
theoretical experiments (see Saad and Gill 2001).  
The Ultimatum Game  
The ultimatum game has been used extensively to measure cooperative tendencies in the 
laboratory (Kahneman et al. 1986; Larrick and Blount 1997; Straub and Mirninghan 1995; 
Wallace et al. 2007). The game is a simple economic game, measuring cooperation, generosity, 
fairness and selfishness. The game involves two players with each player assigned the role of 
proposer or responder. The game is played as follows: the proposer has a sum of money and has 
to decide how to split the money with the responder. If the responder rejects the offer made, both 
players leave empty handed (Falk and Fischbacher 2000). If the responder accepts, the game is 
complete. As we were interested in the influence of attractiveness on cooperation, we introduced 
a second round. When playing the ultimatum game, the rational strategy would be to maximise 
personal income and offer as little as possible to the other player. The proposer has the ability to 
be strategic when distributing an endowment, as offering more than the minimum is beneficial to 
the proposer, suggesting self-interest is a driver in ultimatum game behaviour (Roth et al. 1991).  
Although extremely valuable, many experiments investigating the sexual selection hypothesis 
and generosity have involved hypothetical scenarios, facial images or online simulations (e.g. 
Barclay 2010; Rosenblat 2008; Shinada and Yamagishi 2014; Solnick and Schweitzer 1999). For 
example, Bhogal et al. (2016) conducted a study measuring the effects of physical attractiveness 
and sex on cooperative and generous behaviour in a sample of 187 participants. Using images as 
the static stimuli, they found that males reported significantly higher cooperativeness and 
generosity towards attractive females. Although females also reported higher cooperative 
tendencies towards attractive males, this effect was stronger for males. The above study forms a 
rationale, as we attempted to replicate the above findings in the present study, using an 
alternative experimental framework.  
A limitation of the studies cited above is that they adopt methods that limit the physical cues 
available to participants, which can be remedied by adopting a face-to-face framework (Fontelle 
et al. 1985). Little research has investigated the role of physical attractiveness in game-
theoretical situations where participants are playing with ‘real people’, as opposed to using 
photographs via online simulations. A further limitation of using photographs as opposed to face-
to-face designs is that it limits the ‘richness of each interaction’ in game theoretic- research 
(Solnick and Schweitzer 1999, p. 201). It is our belief that face-to-face interactions provide the 
opportunity to study actual behaviour as much as possible within a laboratory setting.  
This study aimed to investigate whether the proposer’s perceived attractiveness of the responder, 
sex, and self- rated attractiveness influenced allocations made by the pro- poser. We 
hypothesised that proposers would be more generous (offer more coins) to participants they 
consider attractive. Therefore, we predicted that the perceived attractiveness of the recipient 
would significantly predict how many chocolate coins the proposer offers to the responder. In 
addition, we hypothesised that this effect would be stronger for males than females, as males 
display altruism as a courtship signal more often than females.  
Method  
Participants and Design One hundred and thirty-eight participants took part from the University 
of Wolverhampton (mean age = 21, SD = 2.67). There were sixty-nine proposers (39 males, 30 
females) and sixty-nine responders. Seventy- seven percent of the sample were single and 23 % 
were dating. Due to reputation management effects observed in previous research (e.g. Andreoni 
and Bernheim 2009) participants were recruited from a variety of courses and campuses across 
the university. Proposers were randomly paired with opposite sex responders. As part of the 
screening process, only heterosexual participants were recruited due to the theoretical foundation 
of the study. The predictor variables were the proposer’s perceived attractiveness of the 
responder, self-rated attractive- ness and sex. The outcome was the number of chocolate coins 
offered to the responder. We used gold chocolate coins as the endowment.  
Materials and procedure
3 Participants completed a questionnaire before and after playing the 
game, where they were asked for demographic details, how attractive they thought the other 
player was, and whether they would consider going on a date
4 with the other player (all on a 1–7-
point Likert scale, 1 = very unattractive, 7 = very attractive). Participants then played an 
ultimatum game as follows; the proposer was given 10 chocolate coins to distribute with the 
responder. Each participant was given the role of proposer or responder. After the proposer made 
an offer, the responder accepted or rejected it. If the offer was accepted, both players kept their 
coins. If the responder rejected the offer, both players received no coins.  
As generosity has been found to increase when being ob- served by an experimenter (see 
Milinski et al. 2002), the experimenter was not present whilst the game was being played, 
returning once the proposer signaled via a knock on the door. Once one round was complete 
(unknown to participants), the role of proposer and responder was counterbalanced and were 
provided with a further 10 chocolate coins to play another round (the experimenter again left the 
room and returned on completion of the second round). Upon completion, each participant 
completed the post-game questionnaire.   
Results  
5
Multiple regression was conducted to assess the influence of the proposer’s perceived 
attractiveness of the responder (pre-game), self-rated attractiveness and sex, on the number of 
chocolate coins offered to the responder. The total variance (r2) explained by the model was 4.4 
                                                     
3 This study was approved by the University of Wolverhampton behavioural ethics committee. Informed consent was obtained from all individual 
participants included in the study.   
4 Due to high collinearity between the variables ‘perceived attractiveness and dating intention’, the dating intention item was taken out of the 
regression model. 
5 See published paper for tables 
%, F (3, 65) = 1.00, p = .40, f2 = .05. The model, and predictor variables did not significantly 
predict offers made by the proposer. As a result, the experimental hypothesis was refuted. Beta 
values and descriptive statistics are present in Table 2.  
Logistic Regression  
Logistic regression was conducted to assess the impact of the responders’ perceived 
attractiveness of the proposer (pre- game), self-rated attractiveness, sex and the number of 
chocolate coins offered by the proposer on whether the responder accepted or rejected those 
offers (96 % of responders accepted offers, 4 % rejected). The model was statistically significant, 
χ2 (4, n = 69) = 13.35, p < .05, explaining between 17.6 % (Cox and Snell R square) and 58.5 % 
(Nagelkerke R Square) in cooperation and correctly classifying 96 % of cases. As shown in 
Table 3, none of the predictor variables made a significant contribution to the model. Again, the 
experimental hypotheses were refuted as cooperation was not influenced by sex, or the 
responders’ perceived attractiveness of the proposer .  
Discussion  
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether participants were more generous 
towards participants they considered attractive when playing an ultimatum game, a finding 
which has been found in previous game-theoretic research where participants are not engaging 
with real people. However, we found that when participants play an ultimatum allocated their 
stake. Participants may not have felt it to be equitable to offer more to those they found more 
attractive. Perhaps the role of fairness should be further research through an evolutionary lens. 
We know that self-interest can lead to fair behaviour (Chiang 2010), but we are still unaware of 
the evolutionary role of fairness in mate attraction, and signalling. Although fairness has been 
argued to have evolved through natural selection (see Gauthier, 1986; Rawls, 1971), it may 
serves a function in sexual selection and partner choice. Participants may have been fair to others 
because fairness signals one’s moral character (Brosnan 2006). The findings are consistent with 
previous research where participants be- have fairly when distributing stakes (Li and Zhou 2014; 
Rand et al. 2013). Participants are motivated by and prefer equal outcomes (Andre and Baumard 
2011; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). A number of experiments have found that fairness leads to 
positive evaluations (Moser et al. 2014). This study implies that fairness may play a role in 
intersexual competition as participants were fair, regardless of sex or attraction.  
This study has some notable strengths. For example, traditional research investigating 
cooperation and defection has observed behaviour in virtual environments, which have largely 
been conducted online (Wischniewski et al. 2009). The obvious limitation of designs of this 
nature is the use of self-report data where no visual cues available. Using self- report data may 
elicit participant’s ideal behaviour, rather than actual behaviour (Baldwin 1992; Fletcher and 
Kininmonth 1992). This study deals with this limitation by testing the sexual selection 
hypothesis in an alternate framework. Furthermore, an issue with using facial images when 
investigating altruism in the lab relates to the use of facial images only. Findings are then related 
to facial, as opposed to physical attractiveness (e.g. see Solnick and Schweitzer 1999).  
There are some notable limitations of this research. For example, we did not test the hypotheses 
using a non- strategic game. The ultimatum game is an economic game driven by strategy (Eckel 
& Grossman, 1998) as there was a risk to not being fair. If a proposer offers 2 out of 10 coins, 
the responder may not accept the offer leaving both empty hand- ed. Furthermore, there is also a 
social cost to not cooperating. Rejecting an offer reduces the likelihood of being chosen for 
future interactions with that person, and any of his or her game with a real person, people are not 
more generous to- wards those they are attracted to. As a result, our experimental hypothesis was 
rejected. We find no support for the sexual selection hypothesis in explaining the evolution of 
altruism in a game-theoretic setting. Instead, participants behaved fairly, regardless of how 
attractive they considered the other participant to be. Participants did not behave more 
altruistically towards those they found attractive. Furthermore, physical attractiveness did not 
influence whether responders accepted or rejected offers made by the proposer (cooperation). In 
sum, attractiveness had no influence on altruism and cooperation. The finding is inconsistent 
with previous research (e.g. Farrelly et al. 2007; Mulford et al. 1998) which may be due to 
methodological differences. Our study bypassed the typical method of using facial images and 
online simulations when investigating cooperative and generous behaviour.  
Although we have not replicated the null finding reported in this paper by conducting a follow up 
experiment, our finding, that physical attractiveness has no influence on generosity, or 
cooperation, is consistent with previous research by Saad and Gill (2001). Saad and Gill 
conducted an experiment where participants played an ultimatum game in a face-to-face 
framework (consistent with the present study). They also found that physical attractiveness had 
no influence on generosity and cooperation. This supports the central theme of this paper; when 
participants play ultimatum games face-to-face, as opposed to using vignettes, facial images, and 
via online simulations, physical attractiveness does not influence generosity and cooperation. 
Instead, it appears that fairness drives allocation behaviour, which is an emerging theme from the 
findings reported in this study.  
It appears that farness (offering on average half of the en- dowment to the responder) was a 
driver behind how proposers associates (Andre and Baumard 2011) leading to a lack of social 
opportunities (Aktipis 2004). This point may have presented itself as a limitation as behaviour 
was not simply influenced by how attractive the other person was, but was also dependent on 
how one could maximize his or her ‘earnings’ and whether or not a responder came across as 
being a ‘good cooperator’. As a result, future research should investigate the sexual selection 
hypothesis using alternative economic games such as the dictator, trust, or the public goods 
game. Furthermore, we did not consider cultural influences on perceived attraction. Future 
research should test the sexual selection hypothesis as an explanation for altruism across a 
variety of cultures. Future research should also investigate social status and attraction towards 
fair or generous behaviour as social status can influence whether being altruistic is worth it, or 
not (Barclay 2016).  
In sum, this paper extends previous research by providing evidence that attractiveness does not 
moderate generosity when playing a face-to-face ultimatum game. This study pro- vides 
evidence that alternate designs can produce varied results when investigating the sexual selection 
hypothesis.  
Compliance with Ethical Standards There are no conflicts of interest. This research involved collecting 
data from human participants. Informed consent was taken from all participants who took part in this 
study. All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki 
declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.  
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